Private Sector Involvement in Bangsamoro Peace Agenda by MARTE, Harmond Pedrosa & KATAYANAGI, Mari
－ 81 －
『広島平和科学』42（2020）pp. 81-101 ISSN ０３８６-３５６５
Hiroshima Peace Science  42（2020）
Private Sector Involvement in Bangsamoro Peace Agenda
Harmond Pedrosa MARTE
Doctoral Student, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation
Mari KATAYANAGI
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hiroshima University
Research Associate, The Center for Peace, Hiroshima University
Abstract
For over 40 years, Bangsamoro territory has been the site of a number of armed resistance between 
different liberation fighters and the Philippine government. The private sector has nonetheless 
continued its operations inside the Bangsamoro society despite the unstable peace and order 
regime. This article explored the impact of a myriad of risk exposures to companies through 
interviews of four key-informants and the use of Business for Peace (B4P) paradigm. It particularly 
examined employee and community management mechanisms created in adapting to its dynamic 
security environment. The companies operated by working in and with the community, as well 
as assigning combatants to leadership roles. Understanding the local population’s grievance, 
contributing to their well-being by creating employment, and keeping a neutral position in the 
conflict are the measures identified through this study. As the 2014 peace deal involves the private 
sector as one of the stakeholders towards the realization of enduring peace, this research captures 
elements of intervention that can address grievances of the Moro community, particularly on 
historical injustice and the right to self-determination.
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1. Introduction
　　  In March 2014, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF 
signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). This final peace agreement 
culminated a 17-year formal negotiation between the two parties and ended protracted social 
conflicts in Mindanao. CAB is mainly carried out through two tracks, a political track and the 
normalization track. The former focused on the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law 
(BOL) and establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) 
composed of the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. The 
latter is involved in the decommissioning of combatants and aiding them in their transformation as 
productive members of society, among others. 
　　  Challenges to the peace agreement ensued despite the 2014 CAB. Two notable potential peace 
spoilers include the Mamasapano incident of 2015 and the Battle of Marawi in 2017. Described 
as a covert counter-terrorism operation led by the Philippine National Police Special Action Force 
(PNP-SAF), the Mamasapano incident ended in a mis-encounter between PNP-SAF and the MILF 
and the death of 59 lives from both parties due to an alleged lack of coordination (de Jesus and de 
Jesus, 2016). Meanwhile, the Battle of Marawi in 2017 lasted for five months between GRP forces, 
and Abu Sayyaf Group and the Maute Group elements, a political clan that has affiliated itself 
with the terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 
2018). The incident led to the mass displacement of 360,000 individuals, mass hostage-taking, 
looting, and civilian casualties (Amnesty International, 2017). Nonetheless, the BOL saw its 
fruition in July 2018, and the transition period is well in its place.
　　  The peacebuilding agenda in the Bangsamoro attempts to address century-long issues on 
historical injustice and the right to self-determination that are rooted in colonial legacy and 
prejudice based on identity. The peace process encapsulated in the normalization track boasts a 
unique peacebuilding agenda as it blends both disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) and the security sector reform (SSR). This is evidenced mainly by its goals of transforming 
former combatants and their families into productive members of society. The normalization track 
also emboldened the private sector as a stakeholder in the actualization of its security and socio-
economic development goals. This can be seen in multiple articles in the BOL that set the private 
sector as one of the key players in trade, Islamic financing, and housing and human settlement 
programs.
　　  Locating business and peace in the study of peacebuilding has garnered traction in academia. 
The use of Business for Peace (B4P) and Business and Human Rights (BHR) as analytical 
paradigms in looking at the role of business and its societal impact on the development agenda 
have been prevalent in the past decade. The interest in this field was made more pronounced 
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when the United Nations (UN) promoted international standards on human, environment, and 
governance through the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011 and the 
UN Global Compact (UNGC). These norms have set forth expectations for States and transnational 
corporations in respecting and promoting human rights, among others.
　　  Given this context on the peace and business nexus in Bangsamoro, this study aims to 
understand how businesses operate in a conflict/post-conflict region in the Philippines. Following 
tenets of B4P, this research investigates the stakes that local businesses and social enterprises 
have in the overall peacebuilding agenda in the region. The research questions that this research 
seeks to address are: “What are the risk exposures of companies operating in a conflict-affected 
area?” and “How do community relationships factor in the company’s overall operations?”.
　　  The signing of the peace agreement in 2014 and the BOL’s eventual passage accorded 
the private sector space in the overall peace agenda. However, before these developments, local 
businesses have been interwoven in the region’s culture and social realities. This research traces 
the evolving exposure of a business operating in a conflict-ridden area, with a keen look at how 
their presence has helped shape the peace and development in the Bangsamoro.
　　  This paper consists of six sections. The next section explains our methodology followed by the 
section of literature review on peace studies, business for peace paradigms, and existing research 
on Mindanao. The fourth section describes history of the Bangsamoro including the colonial past 
and the land and migration policies implemented by the State. The fifth section presents interview 
results arranged according to two themes: 1) risks and opportunities in Bangsamoro and 2) building 
community ties in the area of operation. The final section is the conclusion that offers a summary 
of the findings and an attempt to establish the roles assumed by the private sector in the overall 
peace narrative in the Bangsamoro.
2. Methodology
　　  This research undertakes a key-informant narrative analysis approach in understanding the 
private sector’s role in the Bangsamoro region. This article covers four participants who are busines 
owners or have assumed c-suite roles in the company. Interviews were transcribed and processed 
using an electronic coding software, MAXQDA. Coding entails a line-by-line reading of the data 
and assigning summative, salient, and essence-capturing words or phrases (Saldaña, 2009). Codes 
are sorted and arranged in categories and subsequently analyzed on how each code relates to one 
another. 
　　  In-person interviews were carried out with business owners operating in Cotabato City and 
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao. Using a semi-structured format, the interview provided more 
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leeway for obtaining descriptions of the world where the interviewee resides (Brinkmann, 2014). 
These businesses operate mainly in the agriculture, hotel, and real estate industries, where it 
hires more than a hundred employees. Respondents were asked about the incentives in keeping 
its operations based in Bangsamoro and opt-out of possibly relocating to other areas. Finally, 
the research seeks to understand the management approach employed by the business owners 
in dealing with former combatants that were part of its workforce. In sum, the questions above 
unpack the private sector’s mutual relationship to the community where it operates.
3. Literature Review
　　  Areas in conflict may undergo decades of peace negotiations and, at times, a reshaping of 
the conflict before it arrives at a peaceful resolution. Galtung (1969) defined negative peace as 
the absence of direct violence. The ability to identify structural violence and ability to see its 
manifest and latent forms are crucial in appreciating the conflict in Bangsamoro, given that the 
core issue rests on alleged injustices. As the way to actualize peace and address structural violence, 
particularly for conflict-affected communities, Galtung (1975) coined the term peacebuilding. 
He proposed that it is through peacebuilding that root causes of violent conflict are addressed 
by creating structures that remove causes of war. Lederach (1997) built upon these concepts of 
Galtung and expanded the scope of peacebuilding by defining it as “a full array of processes, 
approaches, and stages need to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships” 
(20).
　　  Part of peacebuilding in conflict/post-conflict regimes are carried through DDR and SSR 
processes, where the former ensures the safety transition of combatants to civilian life and the 
latter covers the placement of welfare programs that disincentivize combatants from joining 
insurgent movements. The case of Bangsamoro captures elements of DDR and SSR in its 
normalization program and highlights how the peace deal has allowed normalcy in society to 
ensue. Lemay-Hebert and Visoka (2017) argued that normalization is a reformulation of existing 
governmental practices while simultaneously providing spaces for interventionary practices. The 
authors argued that the restoration and presence of business and traditional actors in a post-
conflict setting help restore normalcy and security.
　　  The B4P paradigm has placed a spotlight on private sector as a local peacebuilding partners 
in conflict affected areas. B4P is a multidisciplinary field lifting from practices in management, 
political science, law, and business ethics. Fort and Schipani (2002) argued developing economies 
in the world that are often in conflict zones have increased in number. As such, businesses with 
an international supply chain end up exposed to high risk of violent conflict. Oetzel et al. (2010), 
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Forrer and Katsos (2015), and Miklian (2016) argued that B4P focuses on the activities of the 
private sector in bolstering factors that lead to peace and undermine conflict. Among the identified 
categories of the private sector include economic development, promotion of the rule of law, 
social cohesion, and engagement in track-two diplomacy. Private sector operating in Bangsamoro 
enriches the categories above particularly on the topic of engaging combatants and building strong 
community relationship.
　　  Research conducted in Mindanao has focused on the conflict, ethnolinguistic relations, and 
Moro-Christian interactions. Lara and Schoofs (2016) focused on informal economies and its link to 
the peace and order regime in the Philippines. The scholars further argued that shadow economy 
are crucial considerations in the fulfillment of the Annex on Normalization and Annex on Wealth 
Sharing of the BOL. This articulation of informal business having a space in the peacebuilding 
agenda further bolsters a critical look at the formal business and trade actors.
　　  With the keen focus on informal economy and its impact on the peace and order situation in 
Bangsamoro, this research tackles the other side of the conversation and analyzes formal economy 
as a driver of commerce and component of society. It should also be noted that few research has 
been done on Mindanao that uses B4P paradigm as a framework of analysis.
4. Historical Background of Bangsamoro Conflict
　　  The word Bangsamoro is a combination of the Malay word ‘bangsa’, which means nation, 
while ‘Moro’ was first used in reference to Islamized natives in Manila and later applied to the 
Southern parts of the country as they resembled the Moor people in the Iberian peninsula (Kapahi 
and Tañada, 2018). However, the ‘nation of moros’ dates back before the European colonizers’ 
arrival and is a narrative of rich cross-border maritime trade and strong political governance. 
James Warren (1977) recounts that Sulu has appeared in Chinese literature as early as the Yuan 
Dynasty (1268-1368) as a source for pearl, seaweed, tortoiseshell, and other goods hailing from 
mainland Mindanao, Basilan, and Borneo. In exchange, Sulu traders bartered for Chinese textile 
products and earthware. In the 15th century, the rise of Islam in Sulu and its eventual spread in 
present-day Bangsamoro provinces gave credence to the political and trade value of the Sultanates 
in the region (Bara, n.d.). The Tausugs – the ethnic people in Sulu – started to spread Islam in 
Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Lanao provinces, and Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Maguindanao became 
instrumental in spreading Islam throughout the whole of Mindanao and was vital in fighting off 
expansion plans of the Spanish colonizers.
　　  From 1565, Spanish colonizers succeeded in establishing their stronghold in provinces north 
of Mindanao, including Cebu and Iloilo in Central Visayas. Local Muslim and Hindu tribal groups 
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in the islands were converted to Catholicism, and the Rajahnate political system was replaced by 
Spanish colonial rule. Allegiance to the Spanish crown grew stronger as the colonizers continued 
sending out missions further north that targeted Manila, a critical trade port and an influential 
city with strong trade links with Sulu and Brunei. In order to occupy Manila, the colonizers had to 
invade Brunei and cut off its influence on the city (Bara, n.d.). The city eventually fell to Spanish 
rule in 1571 and has since then become the Philippines’ capital. Majul (1973) described this as 
one of the six Moro wars that spanned throughout the 300-year Spanish occupation. These wars 
depicted piracy, negotiation, and armed resistance against the Spaniards to protect the vassals 
of the Sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao and, at the same time, established the significance of 
Moro history to the grand Philippine narrative.
　　  The colonizers used the Moro identity to justify their actions against the Islamic communities. 
Filipinos who have accepted the colonizers were used to fight Muslims and pit the locals against 
each other. In order to justify its omniscient presence in the colony, the Spanish colonial government 
enforced the Regalian doctrine of land ownership, which allowed the colonizers to own lands that 
they conquered (Calderone-Hayhow, 1994). This doctrine refers to the feudal principle that private 
title to land must emanate, directly or indirectly, from the Spanish crown. Subsequently, this 
doctrine made all lands, including that of Moro lands that have not been subjugated to Spanish 
rule, belong to the State.
　　  The Philippines, including the unoccupied Bangsamoro land, was eventually ceded to America 
following Spain’s defeat (Majul, 1988). With its advanced military force, the Americans were quick 
to takeover Moro land in Mindanao and Sulu. The American policies underscored the economic 
value on land, evidenced by the number of policies it imposed in its new territory. One of the 
American colonial government’s initial policies is the Torrens Title System of 1902 that allowed 
for individual and corporate land ownership (Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
[TJRC], 2016). This nullified communal ownership of land, which was the practice inside ancestral 
domains. Land became a piece of competition among families in Mindanao and has added a layer 
of complexity to the existing practice of rido in Mindanao. Rido or clan feud (and often synonymous 
with revenge killing) dates back to indigenous folk traditions and pre-Islamic beliefs in Mindanao 
(Tan, 2014). It refers to a state of recurring hostilities between families and kinship groups 
characterized by a series of retaliatory acts of violence, including blood revenge and intertribal 
warfare, to avenge a perceived affront or injustice (Torres, 2014).
　　  Following titling policy were waves of resettlement programs that became a floodgate for non-
Muslim communities’ entry to Mindanao. The goal of these programs was to bring workforce to 
the agribusinesses created in Mindanao. Policies such as the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act saw 
the construction of more houses and roads in Mindanao, which was complemented by establishing 
the National Land Settlement Administration of 1939 that invited more Christians to Mindanao 
－ 87 －
(Abinales and Amoroso, 2005).
　　  During World War II, the Philippines was occupied by Japanese forces from 1941 to 1945. 
This period saw the rise of a peasant-led movement known as the Hukbahalap (HUK), a Filipino 
guerrilla movement against the Japanese army, and continued after the war as a communist 
organization. As an acknowledgment of the contribution of the HUKs, GRP rewarded them with 
land settlement programs in Mindanao (TJRC, 2016). This was a strategic attempt to push out the 
communist groups and quell the HUKs outside of Luzon. Moro land has again welcomed outsiders 
into its ancestral domain. These conflating issues intensified the ill-feeling towards the central 
government, notably because land continued to slim down.
　　  The Philippine Military in 1968 launched a covert operation where it established a group 
called Jabidah to create jungle warfare, sabotage, and guerrilla tactics and infiltrate the contested 
island of Sabah (Majul, 1988). When political opponents of then-President Marcos exposed this 
covert operation, an alleged 28 Muslim trainees, who were undergoing guerrilla warfare training 
in Corregidor Island, were summarily executed. This incident, known as the Jabidah massacre, 
surfaced frustration among the Muslim leaders and is often credited as a trigger for Islamic 
leaders to create the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in October 1972 that called for an 
independent Moro nation. MNLF sourced arms from Libya and conducted training in a camp 
provided by Malaysia (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). While the initial years caused a financial and 
political problems to Marcos, the organization’s internal issues, particularly the rift among Tausug 
and Maguindanao leaders, weakened their movement. Certain MNLF members declared a ceasefire 
with the government in 1976 following the signing of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between GPH 
and MNLF (Rood, 2016). Eventually, MNLF personalities held high political and administrative 
positions, where some were political appointees of former President Marcos (Majul, 1988).
　　  Dissatisfied with MNLF leadership, Salipada Pendatun, Rashid Lucman, and Salamat 
Hashim created their political organization in 1977 called the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization 
(BMLO) that sought genuine autonomy and concerned in addressing the Moro problem in the 
country (Majul, 1988). BMLO, after failing to receive recognition from the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) states owing to the standing 1976 Tripoli Agreement, faded away in 1984. 
Salamat pushed forward in creating an organization that represented the goals of the Moro 
community, and in 1985, established the MILF. The MILF has grown skeptical with the progress of 
the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, mainly as it was carried out unilaterally by the GRP (Lingga, 2016). 
MILF leadership declined to participate in the negotiations and instead traveled to OIC members to 
gain support while its armed fighters received military training in Afghanistan (Mapping Militant 
Organization, 2019). During the 1980s, MILF focused on growing its organization, negotiating for 
autonomy arrangement, and building its military armed wing known as the Bangsamoro Islamic 
Armed Forces (BIAF). The weak enforcement of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement gave the MILF room to 
－ 88 －
increase its political presence on the ground by offering social services that included security and 
Quranic teachings to communities near its camps. These activities reflect MILF’s desire for genuine 
autonomy over its land.
　　  Following the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in 1997, MILF signed a ceasefire 
agreement in the same year with the GRP. In 2000, former President Estrada waged an all-out 
war operation against the MILF following a break in the peace talks between the two parties, and 
previous incidents of serious fighting between the two parties. The eventual ouster of President 
Estrada months after the all-out war operations saw a renewed opportunity for talks to ensue. In 
2001, the two parties met in Malaysia and signed the Agreement on the General Framework for 
Resumption of the Peace Talk. Years following this agreement are characterized in a start-and-stop 
negotiation as the peace talks began to invite more international players and international NGOs 
(Rood, 2016). Renewed optimism on the peace talks came with the signing of the Memorandum of 
Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in Malaysia in 2008. As international observers and 
members of the peace panel were en-route to bear witness to this event, the country’s Supreme 
Court issued a temporary restraining order against members of GRP peace panel. Frustrated from 
these developments, members of the MILF established the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighter 
and launched a series of attacks. These incidents displaced 750,000 people and left 400 casualties.1
　　  The peace talks between GRP and MILF took on a new pace in 2011. A historic meeting 
between former President Benigno Aquino Jr. and MILF Chairman Murad in 2011 took place in 
Tokyo, Japan, as part of Aquino’s attempt to display sincerity in the renewal of the peace talks. 
It was also the first in-person meeting between a sitting Philippine president with an MILF 
leader (Bordadora, 2011). What resulted from here was the 2012 Framework Agreement on the 
Bangsamoro (FAB), which served as the precursor towards creating a new autonomous political 
entity, the recognition of a Bangsamoro identity, and discussion on wealth sharing, among others. 
The final peace agreement, known as the CAB, was signed in 2014.
　　  The Moro people’s history is a struggle for self-determination that has been made elusive 
through centuries of injustices brought by colonial policies. Its entrepreneurial past speaks volumes 
on how trade and business are well integrated with its social fabrics. It is then crucial to see how 
business plays a role as the Moros move towards peace.
5. Business and Peace in Bangsamoro
　　  In this section, we analyze the business in Bangsamoro based on interviews of business 
1 “What Went Before: The Proposed MOA-AD” (2012, 9 October). Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved from 
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/285604/what-went-before-the-proposed-moa-ad
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owners. We focus on two themes, risks and opportunities and the relationship with communities.
5.1 Risks and Opportunities in Bangsamoro
　　  First, we look at the risk exposures, as well as the business environment in Bangsamoro. With 
its record-breaking PHP 4.1 billion (around JPY 9 billion) worth of investment in 2019, BARMM is 
keen on making the region a top choice among investors. Interim Chief Minister Al Haj Murad has 
spearheaded several international investment missions to OIC member states and has reportedly 
attributed the development in the peace and order situation as factors to this investment growth 
(Sarmiento, 2020). As of 2021, the region’s Ministry of Trade, Investments, and Tourism (MTIT) 
announced that programs on business matching, halal industry, and farm tourism are among its 
top priorities (Bangsamoro Information Office, 2021).
　　  The signing of the peace agreement in 2014 and the continued cooperation between the 
GRP and the MILF have resonated positively in the business community. However, it is essential 
to point that businesses have long taken space in the Bangsamoro, even at the height of armed 
encounters between the two parties. We will examine the way of operations with four examples.
5.1.1 A Company Operating Since the 1970s
　　  Lamsan Inc. is a corn wet milling company owned by a Filipino-Chinese businessman and 
was established in the province of Maguindanao in 1971. This period in history saw the burgeoning 
Moro independence movement and heightened political unrest against former President Ferdinand 
Marcos. Even in such a volatile situation, Lamsan Inc. continued its operations in Nuling, Sultan 
Kudarat – a forested area that is less than 2 kilometers away from Camp Darapanan, one of the 
strongholds of the MILF. The company’s COO claimed that it continued its operation even when 
intense armed engagements transpired between the military and liberation fighters:
　　When we started, you would say that was unlucky part but when we started in ’71, Martial 
Law was declared in ’72. There was fierce fighting in that area. We couldn’t afford to shut down 
because we would go bankrupt. We kept operating. Even you see bombing in the air, but to be 
fair the area was untouched.2
　　  As a pioneer agribusiness in Maguindanao, the company faced issues in the absence of shared 
services that are often expected from a competitive business environment. There was also a lack of 
incentives for business, including proper road infrastructure and financial system. From its origin 
as a corn wet milling company, Lamsan diversified in order to continue its operations:
2 Interview on September 12, 2019.
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　　It’s very difficult. We want to send our goods somewhere, there is no truck to hire. So we had 
to put our own trucking company. We want to ship it somewhere, we expanded the capacity, 
there is not enough shipping lines going in. We have, on our own volition, to negotiate with the 
shipping lines. You know, in other ports, you have multiple shippers. You have scale. Now, it’s 
like one company negotiating with the shipping line. It’s a different negotiation all together.
　　  In addition, given its close proximity to Camp Darapanan, the company has also welcomed 
combatants rotating in and out MILF services into their workforce. Lamsan believed that the 
combatants did not pose any threat to their business as their grievances are directed towards the 
GRP.
　　They need to work also. And this, they say rebellion, is not really a rebellion. It’s more a 
grievance against some injustice and has nothing to do with civilians. I could say in our 
experience in BARMM, we never felt threatened. We never. There is no harassment. Nothing.
　　  The COO further claims that the presence of the MILF added a stabilizing force in the 
community since the MILF would ward off troublemakers that could potentially alert GRP forces 
and invite unwarranted engagement.
　　In fact, I consider the presence of the camp and the MILF in that area as a very stabilizing 
force...if the troublemakers are there, that would give a reason for the military and the police 
to be there. So, they are the ones who keep out. That is not something that most people outside 
the area think of, but I consider that . That’s one of the most important things, their presence 
there.
The relationship among the company, the MILF and local security thus had positive mutual effects.
5.1.2 A Company Operating Since the 1990s
　　  On top of the tense political environment in the 1970s, the migration of non-Muslim 
communities to Bangsamoro that was initially promoted under American Colonial land policies, 
became a potential catalyst of conflict as Christian settlers began to outnumber Moro communities 
inside their ancestral land (Abinales, 2016). La Frutera, a large-scale banana plantation based in 
Datu Paglas Maguindanao, however, has contradicted notions that the apparent religious melting 
pot in Bangsamoro would invite more conflict among its people. The company started its operations 
in 1996 and has since then stood out as a textbook example of businesses acting as a conduit for 
people with varying religious and ethnic backgrounds to work in unison. Its former chairman and 
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president, Senen Bacani, said that the company workforce is composed of former combatants and 
people from different religious backgrounds:
　　It is the first large scale banana plantation in the Muslim area. In fact, it was the biggest 
investment in that area. It was about USD 20 million (around JPY 2.6 billion). We employed 
a lot of people, around 2,500. We farm about 1,300 hectares of bananas entirely for export, 
and our people basically, 95% Muslim and 5% Christian. And we worked well with community 
leaders.3
　　  The company saw that Bangsamoro, in spite of its peace and order situation, was an attractive 
location to put the business. Among the main pull factor were the labor cost and environmental 
considerations.
　　If you are looking for a lot of land, there is an area where there is a lot of land. In terms of 
labor, there is a lot but unskilled that you have to train. So, the main attraction there is 
basically the natural resources...Land you cannot change the land. Climate, you don’t have 
control over climate too. But people you can have control. Machines you have control. It’s an 
offset. It has a low labor cost because the most underdeveloped area in the country, low cost of 
living, low wages, it has the lowest wages in the country. So, that’s an attraction which can be 
offset by other disadvantages.
　　  Senen Bacani claims that his previous work experience with Dole Foods Company, a 
pineapple grower company based in Polomolok South Cotabato, gave him confidence that security 
issues would not overrule their business interests in Mindanao.
5.1.3 A Company Operating Since the 2000s
　　  Positive strides in the peace negotiation and the continued ceasefire between the two parties 
gave the businesses confidence to expand their interests. In 2009, the Al-Nor Commercial Complex 
was established in Cotabato City. The commercial establishment was put up by a former Overseas 
Filipino Worker who was once based in Saudi Arabia for seven years. In his return to Bangsamoro 
in 1994, Abdulkahar Nul started with a number of small rice trading businesses in Maguindanao.4 
He observed that his business picked up, which gave him the confidence to venture into the retail 
industry. In addition, Nul claimed that his identity as a Filipino-Muslim businessman shielded him 
from the rampant kidnap-for-ransom that predominantly targeted the Filipino-Chinese business 
3 Interview on September 9, 2019.
4 Interview on September 17, 2019.
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community:
　　Kidnapping was just among the Filipino-Chinese community. I am not a target. I wasn’t 
scared. I wasn’t rich. I wasn’t anything special. I was still careful, because that time Muslim-
Christians, they get kidnapped as well.
　　  Hau (1997) noted that Cotabato City has had unreported kidnappings of Filipino-Chinese 
during the 1980s. This practice continued until the 1990s, which resulted in several Filipino-
Chinese owned businesses pulling out of the city and leaving behind large estates. Nul saw this as 
an opportunity to expand. His business reports having 700 employees working across his diverse 
business interests, of which former combatants are hired in his security agency.
　　  In addition, Nul is motivated to show that Moros can own and operate a large-scale business. 
The Al-Nor complex is currently the most prominent commercial hub in the region, with retail 
shops, a mall, and a hotel.
　　Just imagine, all those 700 employees, they have a family. So, a lot of people said that it’s not 
the only thing that I did...There was this senator who once said that the Moro cannot manage 
even a bread. That is not true. This is the proof. I’m a pure Muslim. But why did I manage 
to make it? I’m not saying it’s the best. But you be the judge and see for yourself. So, I will 
not say the name of that senator, but it stayed in my mind. What he said pierced through our 
hearts, that the Moro can’t handle it, that we can’t even handle bread. That became a trigger 
for us.
In this way, Nul used his platform to bolster his Moro identity and showcase the trademark quality 
of a Muslim business owner.
5.1.4 A Company Operating Since the 2010s
　　  The Moropreneur Inc. (TMI), established in 2016, is a social enterprise geared towards 
incapacitating conflict-affected communities in Bangsamoro by providing them skills to create 
climate-resilient and community-based microenterprises. According to its Executive Director and 
Chair, Selahuddin Hashim, the company’s name is a play on the words ‘Moro’ and ‘Entrepreneur’ 
to emphasize the entrepreneurial traits of the Moros.5 TMI, along with its target community, 
envisaged a business model that incorporates peacebuilding and sustainable development in 
its core. As of 2019, the company has helped establish 36 cooperatives on handicraft, oil, local 
5 Interview on September 03, 2019.
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delicacies, and other agricultural products. TMI sees that the social enterprise model helps in 
reaching the community and adding social value in its operations.
　　That is why we see that the approach of social enterprise is a very good pathway because 
it’s biased towards the people who are marginalized, the people who are unheard, the people 
who do not have the voice. These are being tapped. We believe that marginalization is one of 
the major reasons for forming violent extremist group. For us to be able to combat that is to 
provide them alternative options that they can actually utilize to empower themselves. We 
feel that, their needs, their basic needs are being met through social enterprise, then there is a 
bigger chance that violent extremism would not happen.
　　  Among the target participants of TMI are women, indigenous communities, and people 
with disabilities. The cooperatives are people-centered in design in order to instill ownership 
and sustainability in the community. TMI further believes that companies looking to operate in 
a conflict-affected community such as Bangsamoro must develop a high sense of altruism and 
champion first social value over profit.
　　It requires a higher altruism. It requires a higher purpose for companies to invest. I’m not 
looking at profit as the main factor in investing in communities like in our communities 
right now. If you are going to the logic of it, why would investors invest in a conflict-affected 
community?
　　  In over 40 years of armed conflict in the region, the private sector’s security risks have 
evolved. Companies experienced varying threats to their operations as the peace and order 
situation is reshaped by the developments in the peace negotiation. From direct exposure to high-
intensity armed conflict to criminal activities that threatened people’s lives, the peace and order 
situation did not deter the private sector from Bangsamoro. The natural resources, climate, 
and labor remained essential in keeping one’s operations in Bangsamoro. While risks remained 
apparent throughout the company’s business operation, it should be noted that business owners 
have developed a strong sense of calculation that their investments would pay off. In the 2010s, the 
advancement of the peace process resulted in establishment of a social enterprise which not only 
copes with risks but even includes peacebuilding in its agenda.
5.2 Building Community Ties in the Area of Operation
　　  Respondents of this research believed that relationship with the community and having a full 
appreciation of the people’s grievances helped sustain their operations. This sub-section focuses 
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on the relationship of the same four businesses in the area they operate and traces how companies 
developed their management style in dealing with the community and the former combatants in 
their workforce.
5.2.1 Helping Communities
　　  Lamsan’s COO, despite being born a Filipino-Chinese, described himself as Bangsamoro 
owing to the years of living and conducting affairs in the region. The company reinforced its ties 
with the community by locally sourcing its agricultural products for its corn wet milling segment 
and agricultural waste like rice husk and corn cobs for its renewable energy segment. In addition, 
the company has helped provide basic services for both its operations and its surrounding 
community.
　　Outside of the city, there is no pipe water, there is no tap. There are no basic sanitary facilities. 
So when we donate, it’s always deep well. That’s the most basic thing...And we also like to 
give back. We feel like it’s a challenge that we want to make it bigger, locally grown. It is like 
whatever we do, helps the local society at large in BARMM and then it’s a point of pride. We 
could say that we can do it on our own.
　　  In terms of managing former combatants in the workforce, the company claims that it has not 
adopted any specific policy apart from the standard human resource training. Conflict sensitivity 
training for businesses is a crucial element for businesses operating in conflict affected settings 
as it helps in mitigating risks and reduce potential negative impacts (International Alert, 2016). 
Lamsan claims that they deal with former combatants the same way they do for any other hired 
employee. Nonetheless, the company is aware of the unique practices of these employees:
　　You know the concept of 8-hr workday? That’s not in the vocabulary. That’s our personal 
experience. You work and suddenly after 3-hours, everyone is gone. ‘What happened? They 
are tired so everyone went home’. It’s an 8-hr workday and then ‘Sir, they’re already tired’. So 
the concept of 8-hr workday is not there. And the most common job application is security or 
bodyguard.
　　  One element that a company should consider when it hires people is if it also has the capacity 
to fire people. While some of the employees allegedly tested the company, its COO believed 
that through constant reminder of the work structure, Lamsan was able to manage the former 
combatants and help them transition into productive members of the business.
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　　Of course there are threats to the business or there are challenges. That’s a given everywhere. 
But if more people, locals especially, open more businesses, there will be more opportunities for 
everyone. To quote one of the combatants, ‘We are no longer interested in fighting, we are now 
able to taste a pizza’. See, simple thing.
　　  The reintegration of ex-combatants through employment, together with the provision of basic 
services aided the company in building strong ties with the local community.
5.2.2 Hiring a Community Leader
　　  La Frutera, on the other hand, formalized its connection with the community by hiring a 
local community leader, Toto Paglas, into leadership roles. The company believed that this step 
would address concerns on potential religious conflict given that a number of the Christians were 
assigned to higher-ranking roles. Placing Toto Paglas in leadership roles and subsequently hiring 
combatants into senior supervisorial roles help overcome suspicions of favoring one sector, as well 
as improve the overall workplace relations:
　　In the case of Toto Paglas, formally we said he was part of the Executive Committee. So that 
he can also represent the company. In name, he was part of the executive committee, so he 
represented also the company to influence people because he is a respected leader.
　　  Dealing with former combatants in the workforce were coursed through the appointed 
community leaders in La Frutera. Toto Paglas managed the employees and created a way to 
regulate themselves without any imposition from the top management. In this way, community 
leaders took direct ownership of work policies while ensuring that company interests were upheld:
　　For us, we don’t mind people carrying guns because when we started they all carried guns. No 
big deal. But after that we convinced them that there is no need to bring your guns because 
you are just among the same people. Because slowly they didn’t bring guns anymore.
　　  Senen Bacani also believed instituting consistent policy in dealing with the community. The 
communist armed group called New People’s Army (NPA), has a strong presence in Central and 
Eastern Mindanao where part of its means to sustain its activities is to collect revolutionary tax 
from government offices and businesses (Mellejor, 2019). Bacani believed his positive relations with 
the community limited threats such as these.
　　I mean it’s really the way you work with the people. Once you start, it will get repeated. 
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But if your policy is never, I think they would know. Even when I was with DOLE it was a 
multinational, we never had any problems. It’s a question of taking care of the community. If 
the community is okay, the company is okay. If the community is not okay, the company will 
not be okay. It’s as simple as that, we think. Because if the community is okay, they’ll make 
sure that you are protected, and you will continue your operations to the benefit of everybody.
　　  Bacani’s vast experience in businesses in Mindanao as discussed above and his previous role 
as Secretary of Agriculture during the administration of former President Corazon Aquino in 1986, 
became crucial considerations in his assignment as a member of the GRP’s peace panel with the 
MILF during the 2008 MOA-AD negotiation.
5.2.3 Being Neutral
　　  The experience of Filipino-Muslim businessman Nul differs with the rest of the respondents 
in a sense that his operations were in part a result of the peace dividend. Relating with the 
community where he operates rests mainly on his relations with family members linked with the 
MNLF and MILF.
　　For my case as a Moro, no matter what kind of group, well with the exclusion of say Abu 
Sayyafs as long as there’s MNLF or MILF, I have relatives there. I made it a point not side 
with any camp because at the end of the day I’m a businessman, but my relatives, remain as 
my relatives, that will not fade. However, their principles are their own. Whatever is their 
principle, I’m out of it. For my case, I’m just businessman.
　　  Nul believes that his filial links with these organizations are immaterial to why his business 
continued to succeed. He is aware that the MILF carried out its operation under a strict chain of 
command and has spared civilians from the conflict. Unfortunately, these ideas and nuances in the 
peace and order situation in Bangsamoro fail to reach a greater part of the country owing to the 
alleged misrepresentation on the plight of the Bangsamoro in the media.
　　But what we see here, in my opinion, is something different. People don’t get to experience 
these things because MILF and MNLF are not in the business of harassing others. Maybe in 
others, but I don’t know that. But so far in our area and even with my friends when I ask them, 
they would say the same thing. There are groups that misuse the name of MNLF and MILF 
and that’s where things go wrong, but with the individual leaders, I doubt that they would 
engage in these things. These people are professionals.
－ 97 －
The stance of Nul shows that keeping neutrality in regard to the conflict may keep a business 
intact.
5.2.4 Enhancing Collaboration
　　  TMI’s business model is intrinsically linked to the community. With this thrust of helping 
communities out of poverty, TMI has created external linkages within the BARMM government 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to further increase visibility and promote the value of 
social enterprise. This includes the Mindanao Business Council, Mindanao Development Authority, 
as well as international organizations such as the Zero Extreme Poverty 2030, UN Women, and 
the UNDP. TMI further extends its ability of deepening its link with the community by inculcating 
principles of Islam in its business activities.
　　Social enterprises are very akin to the Islamic principles of economic activities. Two things 
in the Islamic economy. The concept is like this. Islamic economy has two frameworks. One 
is ‘Hasbun Minallah’ and ‘Hablum Minannas’. ‘Hasbun Minnallah’ is that everything that 
you do is in service to God or is a worship to God, but the other equation is also in service to 
humanity. So, the kind of economic activities that Islam promotes is a kind of a business that 
yes, you create profit because you need it for you to grow but you have a responsibility to be 
part in community-building or in nation-building as we say.
　　  TMI has also taken an active role in bridging communities outside Maguindanao and links 
with other social enterprises. In partnership with a start-up company, the Maranao Collectible, 
the company was able to create textile product called langkit  that featured the craftsmanship of 
both the Maranao and Maguindanao people. In this way, the private sector became a bridge for two 
ethnic groups to collaborate and foster peaceful relations.
　　What happened is that they (Maranao Collectible) asked for our assistance. So what we did was 
we created langkit-based lace for the Iron Man competition, it’s a national running triathlon 
competition. They needed thousands of them and the Maranao Collectible could not produce 
that volume. Keep in mind that the Maranao in Maguindanao are two different societies and 
two different designs, but because there is a need, we needed to talk to our cooperatives…and 
they were able to deliver. In a way, that’s a very good story... It actually harmonized (the two 
groups). So, the Maguindanao appreciated the Maranao designs, the Maranao appreciated the 
help extended by the Maguindanawan women. That’s a very good story of peacebuilding.
　　  Community relationship has sustained and strengthened the operations of business in 
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Bangsamoro, irrespective of the status of the peace negotiation between GRP and MILF. The 
private sector makes connections in the community by firstly establishing operations in conflict-
affected region. Second, companies strengthen its presence by hiring members in the community 
and sourcing goods directly from the people. In the case of TMI, the company directly helped 
communities design and implement businesses that harness their strengths and help address 
poverty issues. Third, the private sector acknowledged that hiring combatants is a reality that 
they need to face. As most of the companies in the research are family-based and privately-owned, 
we see no attempts in adopting international standards, such as conflict-sensitivity training. La 
Frutera, however, crafted its own employee management design that assigned community leaders 
into management roles. This suggests that companies need to become self-aware of the realities in 
the composition of its workforce, as well as provide avenues for employees to take ownership of the 
operation. Finally, creating linkages within the business communities and to organizations outside 
of Bangsamoro are critical measures to increase collaboration.
6. Conclusion
　　  Bangsamoro has been an attractive location for business opportunities. The region flourished 
economically on the account of its maritime trade importance, while the Sulu and Maguindanao 
Sultanates helped the region rise to political prominence. Trade and politics are both key factors 
that contributed to Moro communities’ resilience against the Spaniards. The region’s long history 
of political independence was regrettably coopted through the policies on land and migration 
during the American colonial period. Liberation fighters, such as the MILF, became instrumental 
in asserting Bangsamoro’s right to self-determination whilst finding solutions to rectify historical 
injustice committed against the Moros.
　　  With the 2014 CAB and its annex on normalization, the private sector has been accented as 
a key player in achieving the goals of providing assistance to the former combatants, transforming 
former MILF camps into productive civilian communities, and creating opportunities for the Moro 
communities to achieve peace. This valuation of the private sector compliments the B4P paradigm 
of activating businesses as a partner for local peacebuilding.
　　  Operating in a conflict affected region such as the Bangsamoro is not without any risk. 
Intense armed engagements between the MNLF, MILF, and GRP disrupted the flow of goods and 
services, and likewise impacted on investor confidence. Nonetheless, Lamsan and La Frutera 
established their businesses despite risks on its infrastructure, workflow, and employees. The 
presence of businesses provided job opportunities for communities that sustained life in an 
unstable environment. TMI used its platform to empower communities in creating its own 
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cooperatives while Al-Nor showcased that businesses managed by a Filipino-Muslim can grow. This 
work opportunity extends to combatants of the MNLF and MILF as well. Working with combatants, 
most of whom were rotating in and out of their service to the liberation movement, was managed 
by companies in the manner that they would normally do with rest of the workforce. However, the 
case of La Frutera suggests that appointing community leaders to management roles is crucial in 
ensuring a peaceful working environment.
　　  Creating business in Bangsamoro is complemented by the relationship of the private sector 
with its community. All of respondents share the Bangsamoro identity and has worked in the 
region for extensive amount of years. Awareness on the grievances of the people and addressing 
them play an important role on deepening the relationship with the community. Lamsan initiated 
the construction of roads and deep-well that has direct benefits to its operations and the people 
in Bangsamoro. TMI believes that intentionally targeting marginalized members of societies and 
providing them with jobs can help reinforce the peace agenda. With reference to dealing with the 
combatants, taking a neutral position as with the case of Al-Nor helped curb potential threats to its 
establishment while a proactive stance of empowering community leaders, as seen in La Frutera, 
ultimately enhance peaceful relations. The private sector in Bangsamoro has taken both intentional 
and accidental routes in becoming a partner in the peacebuilding agenda. With the peace deal in 
place and growth of interest in Bangsamoro, peace and development are attainable aspirations for 
the future.
　　  This research is part of an expansive project on the peace and business nexus in Bangsamoro. 
In compliance to publication guidelines, we limited the interview data to four respondents and 
selected them based on the timeframe they entered in Bangsamoro market. Future research in part 
covers the impact of biases on Muslim communities in conducting business in Bangsamoro and the 
reshaping of peace concept from private sector’s perspective.
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